End to end encryption: what it covers, what it leaves open
Someone tells you a chat is end to end encrypted, and it sounds like a lock on the whole conversation. It is a lock on one part of it. This page covers which part, who can read the message, and what stays outside.
End to end encryption covers the trip: EFF's Surveillance Self-Defense guide says it "protects messages in transit all the way from sender to receiver", so that no one, including the servers of the app you use, can listen in. It leaves open the two phones at either end, because the message is decrypted for the person who reads it, and it does not hide metadata. A copy kept in a cloud backup is another question: it depends on whether that backup is encrypted too. The sections below take each point in turn, with the sources.
What is end to end encryption, and who can decrypt a message
EFF says that end-to-end encryption ensures that information is "turned into a secret message by its original sender" and "decoded only by its final recipient". Its diagram adds: "Only the endpoints (the original devices sending and receiving encrypted messages) can decrypt the message."
The NIST glossary, quoting SP 800-12 Rev. 1, defines the term as "Communications encryption in which data is encrypted when being passed through a network, but routing information remains visible." Note the second half of that definition: even the formal wording says something stays visible.
How transport-layer encryption differs, and why the company servers can decrypt it
EFF contrasts end-to-end encryption with transport-layer encryption. In its diagram of transport-layer encryption, "the company servers are able to decrypt the message, re-encrypt it, and send it along to the next cellphone tower." The message is encrypted on each leg of the trip, but, EFF says, "your messaging service provider—or the website you are browsing, or the app you are using—can see unencrypted copies of your messages." In the end-to-end diagram, only the endpoints can decrypt.
What the app company can and cannot see
EFF says that, with end-to-end encrypted messages in an app, "the app company itself can’t read them". Apple says something of the same kind about iMessage: it "doesn’t store message content or attachments, which are all secured with end-to-end encryption so that no one but the sender and receiver can access them", and Apple says it cannot decrypt the data.
What the company can still see is metadata. EFF says an app developer using end-to-end encryption "may still collect certain types of metadata, like what time a message is sent or your IP address". In EFF's list, encrypting the messages also does not hide "That you and your friend are communicating", "That you are using encryption to communicate", or other types of information about your communication, "such as the location, times, and length of communication".
What the phone and the other person still hold
Once a message arrives, it has been decrypted for the person who reads it. EFF writes that "the message will be decrypted by the person with whom you are communicating". It also warns: "If your endpoints (the devices that you are using for communication) are compromised, your encrypted communications can be compromised." The other person, EFF adds, "can take screenshots or keep records (logs) of your communication". EFF puts this under the heading "What Encryption In Transit Does Not Do".
What the phone keeps at rest is a separate layer. EFF's example is a phone that does not encrypt its stored data: messages sent that way are "safe from snooping and eavesdropping on the network", but "someone will be able to access and read the messages if they get physical access to your mobile device." A cloud backup is one more copy: EFF says to "be mindful to check that your backups are also encrypted".
What Sealbox adds to a channel, and what it cannot hide
Sealbox is an iPhone app (iOS 26+ at launch) that seals the text itself before any channel touches it, each message "encrypted and authenticated, recipient-bound" in the site’s words; it adds to a channel you already use and is not a messenger. It protects the content, so who you talk to, when, how often, that a Sealbox box went by and how large it is stay visible to the channel. And, in the site’s words, "Malware that reads your screen as you read is beyond any encryption app — for everyone."
For the text that stays on the phone, the guide showed above EFF's example of someone with physical access to it. What Sealbox offers for the sealed text is a gate that, by its design, the device passcode does not open. The site says: "Someone who knows your passcode still doesn't open a Sealbox: the keys release only to your currently enrolled biometrics". In the app's code, the keys release only to the enrolled biometrics, with no fallback to the device passcode. By the app's design, someone who has only the phone and the passcode opens the chat and sees the encrypted content (the Sealbox box), not the text, because reading the encrypted content asks for your biometrics.
The limits. The gate covers only the text you write and seal in Sealbox: what was already in plain text on the phone, or was typed straight into the messenger, Sealbox does not seal. The guarantee is, in the site's words, "an engineering guarantee with no known public bypass, not a formal proof". It does not hold against someone who can force your biometrics. Anyone whose face or finger is already enrolled on the phone also gets through, because the gate is the biometrics enrolled now. The site lists "Compelled secrets": "If someone can force your biometrics with the device in hand, or compel your 24-word recovery phrase, they hold the keys". And with the phone unlocked and the app open, what your biometrics opened stays within reach of whoever holds it; according to the site, "If the app sits untouched past a set time, it covers the screen and locks the keys again, and only Face ID reopens it".
On enrolling a new biometric: the app's code asks the system to make the keys valid only for the biometrics enrolled now, and Apple's documentation for that requirement says the item "is invalidated if fingers are added or removed for Touch ID, or if the user re-enrolls for Face ID".
For the other person, who, as EFF says, may keep records of the conversation, the app has view-once, the 1:1 default: its switch in the composer is already on. The app is designed to destroy each message's key when the message is opened; in the site's words, "the key advances with every message, and each message's key is destroyed when the message is opened". So, for what has already been read, what the chat or a backup keeps is only the encrypted content, except the draft covered below, and the site says: "the key to what's already been read no longer exists in the app".
The limits. "The guarantee begins at reading, not at sending: a message you haven't opened yet is still readable to whoever holds the keys." Shared keys, SMS and anything you choose to send in the epoch regime are outside it. The text a reader saves to a draft, where the sender allowed copying, stays too, and goes into the app's backup when there is one: "reading destroys the message's key, not the draft". The app also does not stop a photo of the screen taken with another camera, and, on screenshots, the site says: "Screen capture is designed in too: the text sits in the layer iOS uses for password fields, and a protection screen is meant to cover it while a recording or mirroring is on." And it only works between people who have Sealbox.
On the backup, the app has its own, which holds your identity and is off by default. The site says: "Backup is off by default" and "Without one, no copy exists, and nothing comes back". The messenger's backup follows the messenger's setting, and the site says of the sealed text that the channel "never holds it in the clear — in transit or at rest": what the messenger keeps of a sealed message is the encrypted content, not the text.
The limits. Without a backup there is no recovery: "Lose the phone and your identity is gone". A backup you exported earlier holds the keys and drafts of that moment, and only you can delete it. If you turn the backup on, a copy of your identity exists, encrypted by your recovery phrase: the one from the automatic backup stays in your iCloud and, in the site's words, "Apple stores opaque bytes"; the one from the manual backup is "a file encrypted by your phrase, which you keep wherever you like".
For the endpoint devices, which EFF says can be compromised, what the app offers is to reduce the perimeter, not to cure it: keep the plaintext on a device you deliberately keep off the network, while the connected one only passes the code on; in the site's words, "the phone in the middle never held anything but ciphertext".
On the dedicated device the plaintext still exists, and the site's line about the malware that reads your screen, quoted above, holds for it. And what the connected phone only reads and passes on is the sealed message; a new contact's invitation that passes through it is another weak point: a compromised connected phone can show someone else's invitation in place of yours, and the app treats what it reads by QR as coming from whoever shows it.
Related reading:
- How to encrypt iPhone messages: iMessage, RCS, SMS
- Is Signal app safe? What it covers, what the phone decides
- iPhone security: what settings cover and what they do not
Sources
- EFF Surveillance Self-Defense: What Should I Know About Encryption? — Verified on
- Apple Support: iMessage security overview — Verified on
- NIST CSRC Glossary: end-to-end encryption — Verified on
- Signal Support: Is it private? Can I trust it? — Verified on
Frequently asked questions
What is end to end encrypted messaging?
Messaging in which the message is turned into a secret message by the sender and decoded only by the recipient, as EFF puts it. Signal's help center says its conversations are always end-to-end encrypted, "which means that they can only be read or heard by your intended recipients". Apple says iMessage content is secured the same way.
Can the app company read an end to end encrypted message?
Not the content, if the encryption is end to end: EFF says "the app company itself can’t read them". The company may still collect metadata, such as "what time a message is sent or your IP address", and the person at the other end can still read the message and take screenshots or keep logs of it.
Does end to end encryption make a chat private?
Not by itself. Encryption protects the content, not everything around it, and EFF lists what it does not hide: "That you and your friend are communicating", "That you are using encryption to communicate", and information such as "the location, times, and length of communication". The other person can also keep a copy.
Does Sealbox make my messages end to end encrypted?
Yes for the text you seal, not for the chat around it: Sealbox is not a channel and does not carry the message. It seals the text on your phone before any channel touches it, each message "encrypted and authenticated, recipient-bound", and the site calls the default Quantum mode "End-to-end post-quantum". The channel still sees the metadata above, and the other person needs Sealbox to open it.
No form, no list, no tracker — it's just email. If the button doesn't open your mail app, write to support@sealbox.io with the subject "Notify me".
Coming to the App Store · iOS 26+